Wild DoubleEnder bush plane - photo

[metric_taper]

I don't think that's correct. Thrust acting to push the plane forward from up high, and drag acting to pull the plane backwards acting down low at the wheels will cause a net torque that causes the plane to nose-down. It's not just a sum of forces pushing forward versus forces pushing backward. It's why the 737 Maxs were a failure. They moved the engines up higher which caused a net torque on the airframe that dipped the nose down as thrust was applied.

Just the opposite, the engines being extended well in front of the center of lift causes the nose to be pushed up. MCAS would engage and push the nose back down to prevent stall.
With engines at high level of thrust, this would cause an overspeed of the airframe.

It's frustrating, I worked for the company that was the subcontractor to Boeing (I was retired when all this happened, but us retiree's talk). The real problem was that Boeing marketing drove all the decisions. They didn't want to require any pilot training for this major change to the airframe. Part the the failure was a screwup with the implementation on the subcontractor side (failure to display miscompare, as they thought this was part of the optional software to be purchased by the end aircraft owner). As well any real intelligent systems engineering 'left the building' on the Boeing side. Computer science was the main design input on the subcontractor side (and they lack the physics and math training, and failed to understand the requirements specification document). And these folks, did not have the system experience to see the single point failure of an AOA driving the system into a dive. There are two AOA sensors, and the system should have screamed with a miscompare, of the two. That was masked in the display as that is where the implementation error really was injected.
I still don't understand why airspeed, and attitude were not convolved in the decision to push the nose down, as clearly the AOA vanes were prone to damage and failure. And in all my avionic's training, critical systems (to safe flight and landing) require triple redundancy, and of dissimilar designs, or a design that is verified from all possible faults and their resulting influence to "continue safe flight and landing".
In the end, the crashes were really the result of pilot error, that wanted to keep the automatic pilot engaged, and not hand fly the aircraft.